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Forced Migration, Female Labor Force Participation, and Intra-










Civilian displacement is a common phenomenon in developing countries 
confronted with internal conflict. Persons who are forcefully displaced, 
besides being exposed to direct aggressions, face substantial income losses, 
and, as they migrate to cities, they usually end up joining the informal labor 
force. This paper examines the consequences of forced displacement on 
female labor participation, and its subsequent impact on bargaining power and 
domestic violence. Our results show that women from forcefully displaced 
households are more likely to be employed, work longer hours, earn higher 
wages, and contribute in larger proportions to household earnings relative to 
rural women who remain in rural areas. However, as measured by several 
indicators, their greater contribution to households’ earnings does not 
strengthen their bargaining power. Most notably, domestic violence does not 
appear to change as a response to larger contributions to household expenses. 
Because the children of displaced families have been the direct victims of 
conflict and domestic violence, the intra-generational transmission of violence 
is highly likely.  
 
Keywords: Forced migration, female labor participation, intra-household 
bargaining, domestic violence 
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Desplazamiento forzoso, participación laboral femenina y poder de 









El desplazamiento de población es un fenómeno frecuente en los países 
inmersos en conflictos internos. Para la población desplazada, las pérdidas de 
ingresos son sustanciales y, al migrar a las ciudades, se vinculan a la fuerza 
laboral dedicada a ocupaciones informales. Este artículo examina las 
consecuencias de la migración forzada sobre la participación laboral femenina 
y su consecuente impacto sobre el poder de negociación en el interior del 
hogar. Los resultados muestran que las mujeres desplazadas por el conflicto 
tienen más probabilidad de estar empleadas, trabajan más horas, devengan 
salarios mayores y contribuyen en mayores proporciones al ingreso del hogar 
frente a las mujeres rurales. Sin embargo, su mayor contribución a los ingresos 
del hogar no se traduce en un mayor poder de negociación en el hogar. Más 
aún, la violencia doméstica no parece responder a las mayores contribuciones 
de la mujer al ingreso del hogar. Dado que los niños de las familias 
desplazadas han sido víctimas directas del conflicto y de la violencia 
doméstica, la transmisión inter-generacional de la violencia puede perpetuar 
ciclos de violencia.    
 
Because the children of displaced families have been the direct victims of 
conflict and domestic violence, the intra-generational transmission of violence 
is highly likely.  
 
 
Palabras claves: Migración forzada, participación laboral femenina, poder de 
negociación, violencia doméstica 
Clasificación JEL: D13, D74, J12, J61 
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1.  Introduction 
Internal conflicts abruptly modify the context within which economic agents 
operate, generating benefits and costs to different groups from among the 
civilian population. In addition to the economic impact of the massive deaths 
brought about by combat, warfare alters households’ compositions, reduces 
investment in human capital, depletes productive assets, causes a deterioration 
in the health of children, and creates poverty traps (André and Platteau 1998; 
Justino and Verwimp 2006; Shemyakina 2006; Camacho 2008; Blattman and 
Miguel 2009). On the other hand, internal conflicts can also generate positive 
outcomes. Empirical evidence shows that certain groups within the 
population—such as those connected with armed groups—may see their 
economic conditions improve with the end of conflict; among other things, 
strong institutions may emerge, and collective action may be strengthened 
(Tilly 1992; Verwimp 2005; Bellows and Miguel 2009).  
Despite recent empirical evidence concerning the consequences of 
internal conflict, research regarding other potential channels through which 
warfare affects households, and regarding the heterogeneous impact conflict 
has on different groups of the population (women in particular), is scarce. 
Conflict affects women in a number of different ways. Women face sexual 
assault, are frequently obliged to participate in labor markets (e.g., following 
the death of the main breadwinner or due to sudden drops in income), and are   4 
often forced to become combatants (USAID 2007). In addition, changes 
brought about by conflict may spur more subtle variations in women’s 
behavior. For example, Shemyakina (2009) finds that Tajik women marry and 
have children at an earlier age due to the shortage of adult men due to war 
casualties. Meertens and Stoller (2001) find that conflict may increase the 
bargaining power of women within the household because, when forcefully 
displaced, women actively participate in labor markets—in many cases, 
becoming the main breadwinners. 
Understanding the consequences of conflict for women and identifying 
the channels that transmit them are crucial for designing purposive policies 
aimed at mitigating costs and enhancing unexpected benefits. Moreover, 
inasmuch as the impact of conflict on women easily transfers to children, 
reducing these costs contributes to eliminating the long-term effects of 
warfare, such as malnutrition, a lower investment in human capital, and the 
inter-generational transmission of violence.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of forced 
displacement on female labor participation, and its subsequent impact on 
bargaining power and domestic violence. The rationale of the paper is as 
follows. Forced displacement causes a sharp drop in labor income and large 
asset losses (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ibáñez and Moya 2010). In order to 
compensate for income losses, women’s participation in labor markets 
increases significantly. Since forced migration occurs frequently from rural to   5 
urban areas, the labor experience of women is more relevant to urban 
occupations, while men’s experience is mostly in agricultural activities little 
valued in urban labor markets. As a result, the contribution of women to 
household earnings increases, which may potentially increase their bargaining 
power within the household. Increasing female labor participation may cause 
an unexpected benefit as a consequence of armed conflict—stronger 
bargaining power, improvements in women’s welfare, and greater investment 
in children, particularly girls.  
Our analysis uses data for Colombia, a country that has experienced a 
long-standing conflict for fifty years and has the second largest number of 
forced displacement in the world, after Sudan. During the 1990, monetary 
resources from illicit drug trade funded illegal armed groups, and the conflict 
expanded geographically and intensified, imposing a heavy toll on the civilian 
population. Today, Colombia has near 3.9 million persons that have been 
forcefully displaced, a figure equivalent to 8.4 percent of Colombia’s 
population. The bulk of displacement movement occurred from 2000 onward: 
84 percent occurred in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The period 
ranging from 2000 until 2005 was particularly intense, resulting in 50 percent 
of total displacement.
1  
Identifying the impact of forced displacement on labor outcomes, 
bargaining power within the household, and domestic violence is difficult. 
                                                            
1 www.accionsocial.gov.co, retrieved on the April 12, 2012.   6 
First, only some households in conflict-ridden regions migrate. Engel and 
Ibáñez (2007) find that in Colombia, armed groups more frequently target 
landowners, community leaders, and better-educated households. Thus, 
common unobserved characteristics may influence both the purposive 
targeting of armed groups and the household’s decision to migrate. Second, 
even though the decision to migrate is driven by conflict and is not explicitly 
meant to improve economic conditions, the location decision is not random. 
Presence of friends and family, and economic opportunities offered by the 
destination site, may influence the location decision of households and also 
labor market outcomes. 
We estimate the impact of forced displacement using non-displaced 
households from Colombia’s rural areas as the control group for the displaced 
population, as forcefully displaced persons mainly migrated from rural areas. 
Correspondingly, we expect household and individual characteristics (e.g., 
household structure, education, and labor conditions before displacement) as 
well as unobservable variables (e.g., gender discrimination and cultural norms) 
to be similar for both displaced households and the control group. In 
particular, we expect gender discrimination and cultural norms of both groups 
to be similar given that households in our data migrated less than five years 
before the survey was administered.  
However, households from rural regions that decided to stay despite 
prevalence of violence are systematically different from forced migrants. As   7 
the instrument for forced displacement, we use rainfall levels in the destination 
state. We exploit the exogenous variation in rainfall levels in the out-migration 
state to identify the impact of forced displacement on labor outcomes and 
women’s bargaining power. The practically nonexistent presence of irrigation 
in many regions of Colombia implies that agricultural production and rural 
GDP growth in Colombia is highly dependent on rainfall. Dube and Vargas 
(2010) and (Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004) find that decreases in rural income 
spur conflict and concomitantly forced displacement. Since contemporaneous 
rainfall at the municipal level affects current economic conditions, we use lag 
rainfall at the state level to avoid double causality.  
Our paper finds that the labor income of women increase, whereas 
women’s welfare has at best been constant or has decreased. Despite 
contributing more to household earnings than the control group, the bargaining 
power of displaced women within households is not statistically different from 
that in the control group. At the same time, domestic violence is greater for 
displaced women, who in turn violently punish their children. However, the 
impact on domestic violence disappears in the IV estimations. Since the IV 
estimation exploits the exogenous variation, a higher frequency of domestic 
violence among forcefully displaced households may result from post-
traumatic stress caused by the violent events leading to migration, and not to 
changes in labor conditions.    8 
The results of our paper seem to suggest that, although women are 
more actively involved in labor markets, their condition within households has 
not improved. Since increments in earnings are driven mostly by longer 
working hours and not increased wages, the bargaining power of women from 
forcefully displaced households is similar to that of their rural counterparts. 
Greater contributions to households’ earnings are accompanied by a rise in 
domestic violence against women and children; thus, the unexpected benefits 
of conflict are not straightforward. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section briefly discusses 
the economic impact of conflict, while examining the link among female labor 
participation, intra-household bargaining, and domestic violence. The third 
section presents the empirical strategy, data, and econometric results of our 
study. Section four concludes and discusses policy recommendations.  
2.  Civil Conflict: Its Impact on Female Labor Participation and 
Household Bargaining 
Internal conflicts disproportionately affect the civilian population. Combatants 
purposively attack the civilian population as an effective strategy for 
weakening civilian support for their opponents, expanding territorial 
strongholds, and increasing war loot (Azam and Hoeffler 2002). The 
victimization of the civilian population forces many to flee in order to 
safeguard against aggressions or after being attacked. Pervasive internal 
conflicts and rising attacks against the civilian population in 2010 saw the   9 
greatest number of forcefully displaced persons since this measure has been 
recorded—27.5 million persons worldwide.
2  
During the mid-1990s, illicit drug trade intensified the Colombian 
conflict, and aggressions against the civilian population heightened. Death 
threats, massacres, sexual assaults, selective homicides, conscription, and the 
temporary takeover of towns forced the population to flee in a search for safe 
havens. Today, 3.9 million Colombians—equivalent to 8.4 percent of 
Colombia’s population—were forced to migrate. Forced displacement is not 
confined to isolated regions of Colombia. More than 90 percent of Colombia’s 
municipalities
3 have expelled or received displaced persons.
4  
The evidence for Colombia shows that forced displacement imposes on 
its victim huge economic costs. First, losses of productive assets due to 
destruction and illegal seizure weaken the main income sources of displaced 
households. Second, returns to human capital drop. Most displacement occurs 
from rural to urban areas. Because the labor experience of displaced persons is 
usually mostly in agricultural activities, finding a job at destinations sites 
proves difficult and labor income drops significantly. Third, access to financial 
capital and risk coverage is limited, which increases the vulnerability of 
displaced households to future shocks. The occurrence of all these losses may 
                                                            
2 www.internal-displacement.org, retrieved April 16, 2012.  
3 Municipalities are the smallest administrative units in Colombia. The country is divided into 1,100 municipalities. 
4 www.accionsocial.gov.co, retrieved May 26, 2010.   10 
push displaced households into poverty traps that are difficult to overcome 
(Ibáñez and Moya 2010).  
Participation in urban labor markets is often difficult for displaced 
persons. Low education levels and a labor experience predominantly in 
agricultural activities becomes an obstacle to finding a job in the new urban 
setting. However, access to labor markets is heterogeneous for male and 
female. While women’s skills are more akin to the demands of urban labor 
markets, the agricultural experience of men is hardly valued. The need to 
compensate for large income losses and the higher probability of finding a job 
pushes women to work.  
Some studies argue that migration, by improving women’s labor 
conditions and increasing their contribution to household earnings, may 
strengthen their bargaining power within households (Chen, Conconi et al. 
2007). This impact may be further enhanced when women migrate from rural 
to urban societies, where gender-based discrimination is less intense. In the 
case of forcefully displaced women in Colombia, the larger demand for the 
skills of forced female migrants, in contrast to male ones, may amplify this 
effect (Meertens and Stoller 2001).  
Distribution of power within a household is determined by the threat 
point, which is represented as the utility of opting out of a marriage or existing 
in a non-cooperative one. Economic conditions, the institutional environment, 
and the cultural context, among others, determine the threat point of each   11 
spouse. Improvements in women’s economic conditions or/and an exogenous 
change in the institutional or cultural environment favoring women alter the 
distribution of power within a household.  
The empirical evidence shows that rising female contributions to 
earnings do not always translate into increased bargaining power. Increments 
in women’s actual or potential wages improve their economic options 
following divorce or even if the marriage remains intact, thus leading to a 
redistribution of power within households. Conversely, when women’s 
earnings rise because the number of working hours increase hours and not 
because wages rise, their bargaining power remains constant (Chiappori, 
Fortin et al. 2002; Pollack 2005; Anderson and Eswaran 2009; Aizer 2010).  
Establishing the causality between wages and bargaining power is 
difficult. Spouses may overinvest in education prior to marriage in order to 
gain a bargaining advantage during marriage or may increase their labor 
participation in anticipation of divorce (Pollack 2005; Stevenson 2008; 
Anderson and Eswaran 2009).  
Several studies rely on an exogenous shift in economic conditions or 
the institutional environment in order to identify a causal link between changes 
in bargaining power and women’s welfare. Findings show that shifting power 
to spouses in households allows women to appropriate a greater share of the 
gains derived from marriage interaction and increases leisure time and   12 
investments in children (Gray 1998; Chiappori, Fortin et al. 2002; Duflo 2003; 
Rangel 2006) 
Domestic violence also has implications for power relations within 
families. On the one hand, domestic violence serves as a form of control over 
spouses or a way of influencing their behavior (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; 
Bloch and Rao 2002; Bowlus and Seitz 2006). Stress (in particular economic 
stress), poor self-esteem, traditional ideas about gender roles, and having 
witnessed abuse as a child are other factors correlated with domestic violence 
(Gelles 1976; Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bowlus and Seitz 2006). On the 
other hand, changes in economic conditions favoring women help reduce 
domestic violence (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bobonis, Castro et al. 2009; 
Aizer 2010).  
Nevertheless, the link between female labor participation and domestic 
violence is highly dependent on decisions made prior to marriage as well as 
male labor conditions. Deterioration in male labor conditions sometimes 
causes an escalation in domestic violence, which serves as an instrument for 
releasing frustration and venting stress (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Macmillan 
and Gartner 1999; Bloch and Rao 2002). When male unemployment is 
accompanied by an improvement in female labor conditions, the risk of 
violence may increase further. Husbands are more likely to resort to violence 
and coercion when losing their traditional role as the sole breadwinner and 
having a disadvantage in power vis-à-vis their spouses (Macmillan and   13 
Gartner 1999). In the case of forcefully displaced women in Colombia, the 
need to vent stress—due to frustration caused by unemployment and the 
violence endured prior to migration—as well as the challenge to traditional 
gender roles seem to induce an escalation in domestic violence (Meertens and 
Segura-Escobar 1996).  
3.  Empirical Framework 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of forced displacement on 
female labor participation, female bargaining power, and domestic violence. 
We assume a non-unitary model in which decisions within the household are 
based on each spouse’s utility function. The bargaining power of each spouse 
determines the distribution of goods within the household, represented by 
consumption and leisure time. Women’s consumption includes their 
investment in children.  
The threat point—the utility a spouse potentially achieves following a 
divorce or in a non-cooperative marriage—determines the spouse’s bargaining 
power and ability to appropriate a larger share of goods. As spouses are better 
able to earn higher wages and achieve higher consumption levels on their own, 
the threat point—and thus their bargaining power—is stronger. Any change in 
economic conditions that increases women’s returns in the labor market will 
also improve their bargaining power within the household, thus implying 
greater consumption, more leisure time, and a greater investment in children. 
Spouses anticipate the bargaining process that will take place within the   14 
marriage and invest in education in order to tilt the distribution of power to 
their advantage. Similar to other papers, we assume that domestic violence 
produces utility for males (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bowlus and Seitz 2006; 
Aizer 2010). Violence becomes a source of gratification, by which they might 
release frustration or vent stress, as well as an instrument for controlling 
victims.  
The empirical framework described above has several implications. 
First, increments in females’ wages, by strengthening the threat point, 
contribute to an increase in their bargaining power. Second, women’s higher 
bargaining power implies a larger appropriation of goods within the 
household, represented by higher consumption levels and a greater investment 
in children, as well as more leisure time. Third, given that women anticipate 
the bargaining process within the marriage and may decide to increase their 
investments in education, employment and bargaining power—likewise, 
employment and domestic violence—have a reverse causality. Fourth, a wife’s 
increasing contribution to household’s earnings does not necessarily translate 
into higher bargaining power. If the increased contribution comes through 
more hours dedicated to work and thus fewer to leisure time, a woman’s 
bargaining power will remain constant, at best, or may even decrease. Lastly, 
when females’ economic contributions to the households are rising while 
men’s contributions are simultaneously decreasing, the need to exercise 
control upon the spouse and to vent stress causes an increment in violence.    15 
The empirical framework described above is used to examine the 
impact of forced displacement on labor conditions and bargaining power. 
Conflict forces households to migrate to urban areas, after being victimized or 
in order to prevent future aggressions. Migration is thus not a voluntary 
decision to improve the economic conditions of a household’s members. 
Displaced women participate actively in labor markets, whereas prior to 
migration, their work was confined to domestic activities (Meertens and 
Stoller 2001). Although women’s contributions to household earnings are 
much greater after displacement, increased working hours in larger 
proportions to increments in wages are the main force driving this increment. 
Additionally, the re-allocation of the gender-based division of labor within the 
household, whereby women may become the main breadwinners and men may 
face long spells of unemployment, increases tensions within the household and 
may cause domestic violence to escalate (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996). 
Forced displacement may create a vicious cycle, wherein women spend longer 
hours working and have less leisure time, and domestic violence escalates. 
Thus, the suggested “women’s empowerment” brought about by conflict may 
hardly be a reality. 
One important feature of forced displacement facilitates our empirical 
analysis. Prior to displacement, the education decisions of displaced women 
are based on a context completely different from the post-displacement one: it 
is a rural context, where traditional gender roles predominate and returns to   16 
education are extremely low. This implies that, for displaced women, past 
education decisions are exogenous to present labor market participation. 
Although the conflict has been ongoing for near fifty years, attacks against the 
civil population intensified during the 1990s, when illicit drug-trade resources 
fueled conflict and allowed armed groups to expand territorial control. The 
peak of forced displacement was between 2000 and 2005. The households we 
examine in this paper were not able to anticipate the heightened aggressions 
against the civil population or to change their education decisions 
concurrently.  
3.1. The Data 
Two different sources of data are used in this paper. The first is the 
Demographic and Health Survey for 2000, 2005, and 2010 (DHS-2000/10). 
This survey is representative of the Colombian female population, ranging 
from twelve to fifty years of age, and covers 232 municipalities in thirty-three 
departments. The survey collects, among other things, information on fertility 
behavior, child conditions, decision making within the household, and 
domestic violence. The DHS surveys for 2000, 2005, and 2010 oversample 
displaced households so as to ensure a representative sample of forcefully 
displaced women. Although the questionnaire collects information on the 
causes and process of migration, the 2005 and 2010 surveys do not ask about 
the municipality of origin. Since we are interested in households that were   17 
married before forced migration took place, we eliminate all households that 
have a forcefully displaced person but were created after migration.  
The second is the National Household Survey 2001–2005 (using its 
acronym in Spanish, ECH 2001–2005), which is a repeated cross-section of 
household survey data collected quarterly by the National Statistics 
Department (DANE) for the thirteen largest metropolitan areas and for rural 
areas. The questionnaire for the first quarter includes migration questions that 
identify displaced persons as those who migrated due to violence and conflict. 
The module elicits detailed information on the migration process: the year of 
migration, the municipality of origin, and the cause of migration. The sample 
included in the paper covers the period from January 2001 to March 2005 
because the migration module was included only for these years. However, 
this is the ideal period in which examine forced migration. First, half of total 
displacement occurred between 2000 and 2005. Second, since changes in 
social norms, patriarchal structures, and gender discrimination are slow, we do 
not expect forcefully displaced households to diverge in these respects from 
their rural counterparts. The National Household Survey also collects 
information on household characteristics, education variables, and the labor 
force.  
Both surveys include questions at the individual level to identify 
forcefully displaced persons. Since the purpose is to examine changes in 
bargaining power due to displacement, we restrict the sample to married or   18 
cohabiting couples formed prior to forced migration. We identify forcefully 
displaced households when the households and the spouse migrated due to 
violence. It is important to note that 90.6 percent of forcefully displaced 
persons migrate with all households members (Ibáñez 2008).  
Armed groups attack municipalities with particular characteristics in 
order to achieve war strategies. In order to eliminate possible selection biases, 
we construct two samples: (i) a sample of rural households, and (ii) a sample 
of rural households from municipalities featuring an out-migration of 
forcefully displaced persons. However, the difference between these samples 
is minimal: only a few municipalities do not report out-migration of a 
forcefully displaced population (1.4% and 0.9% for the DHS2000/10 and ECH 
2001–2005, respectively). Since the results are robust for both samples, we use 
the first sample to improve the efficiency of our estimates, yet we also provide 
the results for the second sample as a robustness check.  
Two additional sources of data complement the household surveys. 
Rainfall data is collected by IDEAM, the state climatic institute, in 1,800 
climatic stations located along the Colombian territory. The period covered is 
from 1970 till 2010. Municipal characteristics are from the CEDE municipal 
database, which contains municipal information for the period ranging from 
1980 until 2010.  
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3.2. Our Estimation Strategy 
The purpose of the estimation strategy is to examine the impact of forced 
displacement on labor conditions, bargaining power, and domestic violence. 
We examine impacts on the labor conditions of members living in households 
with married or cohabiting partners (henceforth, married) using the ECH 
2001–2005. We expect forcefully displaced married women to work longer 
hours and earn wages that are higher than or similar to those of their rural 
counterpart. On the other hand, we expect forcefully displaced married males 
to work similar hours as their counterparts and to have similar or lower wages. 
In order to identify the effect that being a displaced person has on labor 
conditions, we use the following reduced form of labor outcomes: 
                                                     	 
where       denotes hourly wages or the number of working hours per week 
for individual i in municipality j in state k at time t,      are municipality 
characteristics such as taxes collected per capita and homicides rates, and       
are individual characteristics that influence labor outcomes such as potential 
experience, the years of education completed, and the number of household 
members. Besides municipal characteristics, we include year dummies (  ) 
and state-fixed effects (  ) to control for potential demand shocks, conflict 
dynamics, and unobservables. The variable	      is a dummy variable equaling   20 
one if the individual was forcefully displaced and with   as the parameter of 
interest.  
Hourly wages are for those members of the working-age population 
(twelve–sixty-five years of age) who have a complete report on all earnings. 
Weekly working hours also correspond to the working-age population and 
include both main and secondary occupations. We estimate the regression for 
the whole sample—married or cohabiting men, and married or cohabiting 
women. By comparing the whole sample to the married or cohabiting sample, 
we are able to identify whether the results are for the entire displaced 
population or are limited to married or cohabiting couples. We also estimate 
these regressions separately for different age groups: (i) twelve
5 to sixty-five 
years of age, and (ii) eighteen to sixty-five years of age. 
The regressions are estimated using the Heckman selection model. As 
exclusion variables for the selection probability of labor force participation, 
we use the number of children in the household under five years of age. Since 
forced displacement affects the selection probability and the subsequent labor 
outcomes, we estimate first the IV regression for the selection equation stage 
and calculate the Mills ratio predicted value of displacement, which in turn is 
included for the second stage. We correct the standard errors using boot-
strapped standard errors.  
                                                            
5 The Colombian Statistical Office measures the labor force starting at twelve years of age. In 
order to have consistent labor information, we use this definition.    21 
We use two sources of data to estimate the impact of forced 
displacement on bargaining power. The first source of data is the ECH 2001–
2005. A measure of bargaining strength is constructed based on wages. Let    
denote female wages, and    male wages. Bargaining strength is measured as 
             ⁄ , such that, as women’s wages increase, their contribution to 
households’ earnings will rise if working hours remain constant. The 
estimation strategy for bargaining strength measured with wages is thus 
identical to that for labor outcomes. 
Even though forced displacement is a response to violence and not a 
strategy to improve labor conditions, we face two challenges to establish 
causality. First, armed groups deliberately attack certain groups from among 
the population such as wealthy individuals or community leaders, among 
others. Second, the decision to relocate in a particular city may depend on 
labor conditions. We control for the education of the household head and 
spouse, and for household size, both of which are proxies for economic status 
prior to displacement.  
Unobservable characteristics that determine purposive targeting, the 
decision to relocate, and labor outcomes may bias our coefficient estimates. To 
instrument forced displacement for labor outcomes, we use yearly rainfall 
during the year before forced migration of the household in the out-migration   22 
state.
6 Weather shocks provide an exogenous variation for economic shocks, 
which are related to an intensification in violence arising from conflict, to 
attacks against the civil population (Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004; Dube and 
Vargas 2010) and subsequently to forced displacement. Since 
contemporaneous weather shocks may also alter labor conditions for the rural 
population, we use rainfall the year previous to migration at the state level and 
not at the municipal level. This variation is exogenous to the households’ 
characteristics, and we use it to identify the effect of forced displacement.  
There is one potential threat with our identification strategy. The 
instrument is valid if lagged weather shocks are not related to current 
economic and labor conditions. In order to rule out this possibility, we 
estimate municipal tax collection (a proxy for municipal GDP), and municipal 
agricultural credits from two state banks on the instrument. We also control for 
municipal investments from local authorities, homicides, and total 
displacement rates, as well as year and municipal fixed effects. Results on 
Table 1 show that the coefficient estimate on lagged total rainfall is not 
statistically significant. This holds before and after including controls for 
violent events in the municipality. Thus, our instrument does not appear to 
affect economic and labor conditions directly. 
[Table 1 goes about here] 
                                                            
6 Total rainfall in each state was computed as the average of the total rainfall records from all 
weather stations located within the state. IDEAM measures rainfall in millimeters (mm). For 
estimating purposes, we used a linear transformation of 1 x 10
-3 mm.   23 
The second source of data measuring bargaining power is the DHS 2000/10 
data, which collects information on several variables that proxy bargaining 
strength within households as well as on domestic violence. To estimate the 
impact of displacement on bargaining power and domestic violence, we use 
the following reduced form:  
                                                   , 
where       represents bargaining power or domestic violence. As measures of 
bargaining power, we use whether the wife has a final say on health issues, 
large purchases, daily needs, and food expenditures. Final say for the wife is 
defined as when she alone makes the final decision. However, the results were 
robust for different definitions. We also define two more strict measures for 
bargaining strength: (i) whether the wife has the final say on all issues, and (ii) 
a principal component index constructed using four individual measures for 
final say. Domestic violence is defined as whether the wife had experienced 
any mild or severe violence at the hand of her partner. Because domestic 
violence against women may spur violence by the mother against her children, 
we also estimate the impact of forced displacement on violent punishment by 
the mother and the father separately against children. 
We control for municipal homicide rates and municipal tax collection 
(    ). As additional controls (     ), we include the age of the wife and 
partner, the years of education of the wife and partner, a wealth index   24 
estimated using principal components, the number of household members, a 
dummy variable indicating whether the household contains children under five 
years of age, and a group of dummy variables for length of marriage. As an 
additional control for domestic violence, we include a dummy variable 
equaling one when the father mistreats the mother of the forcefully displaced 
women. This variable captures the propensity for violence, as individuals who 
were more exposed to violence as a child are more likely to inflict violence on 
their partners (Gelles 1976; Bowlus and Seitz 2006).  
We control for two additional variables that might be correlated with 
forced displacement. First, we control for the labor conditions of the partner, 
using a dummy variable equaling one when the partner is employed in an 
unskilled occupation. Domestic violence may arise from frustration with labor 
conditions and not necessarily due to changes in intra-household bargaining. 
Since forced displacement changes both sources of domestic violence, the 
coefficient estimate may also be capturing male frustration due to deteriorating 
labor conditions. Second, we also control for other sources that may strengthen 
women’s bargaining power and that are also caused by forced displacement—
for instance, whether the brother and/or sister of the spouse migrated with the 
family.  
The dummy variable	      is equal to one if the individual was 
forcefully displaced, while   is the parameter of interest. Unfortunately, the 
DHS 2000/2010 does not collect detailed information on the migration   25 
process. Thus, we are not able to identify the out-migration municipality for 
forcefully displaced persons. We instrument forced displacement with total 
rainfall in the year previous to forced displacement in the state of origin. If 
migration occurs between states, our instrument could have a weak correlation 
with the dummy variable for being forcefully displaced. However, nearly 60 
percent of displaced households migrate within their state, and most (95 
percent) migrate directly to the city in which they settle (Ibáñez 2008).  
We eliminate economic migrants from the sample. Economic migrants 
move to other cities in order to seek better opportunities. The empirical 
evidence shows that the bargaining power of migrant women improves. If we 
include migrants in the sample, the coefficients for displacement might be 
overestimated. However, we estimate the same regression for migrants as a 
robustness check. The purpose of comparing forcefully displaced persons with 
economic migrants is to establish whether the impacts are caused by the 
change in context brought about by any particular type of migration, or 
whether forced displacement produces particular transformations in behavior 
within a household. In order to instrument for migration, we use the share of 
economic migrants, a frequent instrument utilized in the migration literature 
(Altonji and Card 1989; Card 1990; Lalonde and Topel 1991). Since we obtain 
this figure from the Population Census of 2005, the instrumented estimations 
only use the ECH and DHS data from 2005.  
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3.4. The Results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics comparing the displaced population and 
the control group. Overall, displaced households and rural households are 
similar. The statistical difference between the groups is not significant. 
However, displaced households are more educated than their rural 
counterparts, presumably signaling that better-off households are more likely 
to be attacked by armed groups.  
Forced displacement seems to change female labor conditions 
significantly. Although the employment levels are similar, displaced women 
work six hours more per week than do their rural counterpart, and their wage 
rates are 2.1 times higher. Conversely, displaced men fare worse than rural 
male workers. Employment rates are 18 percentage points lower, yet those 
who are employed work more hours per week and earn higher wages. A first 
approximation of bargaining strength, measured as the ratio between female 
wage rates divided by the sum of female and male wage rates, shows that 
women’s contribution to household earnings are 33 percent higher for 
displaced women than their rural counterpart.  
 [Table 2 goes about here] 
More detailed information on bargaining strength and domestic 
violence is collected in the DHS2000/10. We include information on whether 
the spouse has a final say over a wide arrange of dimensions—health issues,   27 
large purchases, daily needs, and expenses on food for consumption (see Table 
3). Displaced women report a stronger influence over all dimensions apart 
from having a say regarding food expenses. When using a more strict measure 
of influence on household decisions, 8.2 percent of displaced women report 
having a final say over all dimensions, in contrast to 7.8 percent of rural 
women. Again, the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the 
contribution of displaced women to household expenses is substantially larger 
than that of rural women in the control group, yet this does not seem to be 
improving women’s power within households.  
Moreover, domestic violence is more prevalent among displaced 
households. In contrast to rural women, displaced women more frequently 
report being the victim of mild violence (36.0% vs. 30.8%) and severe 
violence (14.7% vs. 9.1%). The differences are statistically significant for mild 
and severe violence. The propensity for domestic violence, measured with a 
dummy variable equal to one if the father of the women exercised domestic 
violence against the mother, does not seem to be driving a higher frequency of 
domestic violence within displaced households. Whereas 26 percent of rural 
households report that the father’s parents mistreated him, this figure is 35 
percent for displaced households. Domestic violence against women appears 
to induce harsh punishment against children at the hands of their mothers, as 
displaced children are ten percent points more likely to be violently punished. 
Conversely, the difference in violent punishment at the hands of fathers is not   28 
statistically significant between fathers from forcefully displaced families and 
their rural counterpart.  
[Table 3 goes about here] 
The figures in Table 4 confirm the differences shown in Table 2. 
Displaced persons and the control group are similar: the ages of household 
heads and spouses, household sizes and the number of children less than five 
years of age in households are similar. As with the ECH2001–2005 data, 
displaced persons are better off and have higher levels of education, which 
presumably signals targeting against better-off families.  
[Table 4 goes about here] 
Table 5 reports the estimation results on the first stage of all labor 
outcomes. The coefficient estimates for total rainfall are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The F test for relevance of the instrumental 
variable is large, showing that the instrument is strongly correlated with forced 
displacement.  
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the probability of 
employment for the sample between twelve and sixty-five years of age 
(selection probability). Because coefficient estimates are robust to gradually 
including other controls, we only report the results with all the controls for the 
following tables. OLS results for the selection probability show that whereas 
women’s labor conditions are better for displaced women vis-à-vis rural   29 
women, men from forcefully displaced households are less likely to be 
employed. When the sample is restricted to married and cohabiting couples, 
this disadvantage widens. On the other hand, female employment among the 
forcefully displaced is higher. After instrumenting forced displacement, results 
for women are not statistically significant, yet forcefully displaced men are 
less likely to be employed, and the effect for married men is larger.  
 [Table 6 goes about here] 
Table 7 reports the estimation results for the number of hours worked 
per week by gender, log hourly wages and different measures of bargaining 
strength for the sample between twelve and sixty-five years of age. The 
number of hours worked per week is higher for all groups of the displaced 
population for the OLS results. The IV coefficients show that forcefully 
displaced men and women work more hours, yet the coefficient is lower 
(higher) for married men (women). Since the forcefully displaced arrive to 
urban areas, wages are higher for forcefully displaced than for their rural 
counterpart. The coefficient estimate for displaced men and women is 
statistically significant and positive, implying larger wage rates for forcefully 
displaced persons. After instrumenting, the coefficient estimate for married 
women is significant at the 1 percent level and is larger than the coefficient for 
married men. 
The sharp decline in income caused by forced migration, and the 
difficulties partners face finding a job once at destination cities, may push   30 
displaced women to expand their working hours. Prior to displacement, the 
contribution of displaced women to household earnings was presumably low, 
as they mostly dedicated their time to household chores. Income earned by 
forcefully displaced women is larger in contrast to rural ones due to longer 
working hours and higher wages. 
Women’s contributions to household earnings are likely to be larger for 
the forcefully displaced. However, larger contributions do not necessarily 
strengthen bargaining power. If longer working hours mainly drive larger 
contributions, bargaining power may not be different. We use a ratio of female 
wages compared to total household wages as a first approximation of 
bargaining strength. The results are reported in Table 7. The coefficient 
estimate for displaced women is statistically different from zero. Thus, women 
from forcefully displaced households are contributing more to household 
income than their rural counterpart. Results for the sample between eighteen 
and sixty-five years of age are very similar; thus, we do not include the tables.  
[Table 7 goes about here] 
Table 8 reports estimations when we restrict the control sample to out-
migration municipalities. Not surprisingly, as only 0.9 percent of 
municipalities in the sample do not report out-migration, coefficient estimates 
do not change. 
 [Table 8 goes about here]   31 
As a robustness check, we estimate the same regression for economic 
migrants originating from rural areas and living in urban areas. We only report 
the coefficients for the IV estimation. Our findings in Table 9 show that 
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant for migrant women after 
instrumenting, showing that differences in labor conditions of forcefully 
displaced women are not caused by mere relocation, but by other processes 
occurring within their households.  
[Table 9 goes about here] 
Our estimation results based on the ECH2001–2005 indicate a 
significant difference in the labor conditions of displaced women in contrast to 
their rural counterpart. In contrast to rural women, displaced women 
participate to a greater extent in labor markets, work a greater number of hours 
per week, and earn higher wages: 15.6 more hours per week, which is 
equivalent to a difference of 46 percent with respect to the control group. 
Parallel to higher working hours, displaced men fare worse as they face a 
lower probability of employment. Employment for married men is 12.6 
percentage points lower for men from displaced households than for rural 
men. These differences in labor conditions for displaced women result in a 
larger contribution to household income. 
Displaced women’s larger contribution to household expenditures does 
not appear to translate into a stronger bargaining power within the household. 
Table 10 reports results for the first stage IV estimation, and Table 11 shows   32 
the results for whether women have the final say on a number of decisions 
within the household—health issues, large purchases, expenditures on daily 
needs, and food purchases. In addition, we report the results for stringent 
measures of bargaining power: whether women have a final say on all issues 
and a principal component’s index built upon the four questions. We estimate 
standard errors clustered at the state level. The F-test for the relevance of the 
instrumental variable is large, and the coefficient estimate for the instrument is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level (Table 10). Because 
coefficient estimates are robust for the different specifications, we only report 
the results for the estimations using all controls. The OLS and IV coefficient 
estimates for the displacement dummy are not statistically significant for all 
measures of bargaining power. In fact, the OLS coefficient estimate for having 
a final say on health issues is negative and statistically significant. Thus, while 
displaced women earn a large proportion of household income, their share of 
power within the household is not statistically different from that of rural 
women.  
[Table 10 goes about here] 
[Table 11 goes about here] 
Results for domestic violence are not conclusive. Table 12 reports the 
estimation results for whether women experienced any form of mild violence 
or severe violence at the hand of their partners, respectively. The coefficient 
estimates for traditional controls are similar to other studies. Domestic   33 
violence is more likely in households where husbands and spouses are less 
educated, are younger, and were raised in violent households. OLS results 
show that women from forcefully displaced households are victims of severe 
domestic violent with a larger probability: a displaced woman is 3.9 percent 
more likely to experience severe violence at the hands of their partner, which 
is equivalent to 43 percentage points larger vis-à-vis the control group. The 
result holds after controlling for the partner’s occupation. Interestingly, the 
migration of brothers and/or sisters, a proxy of a woman’s social network, acts 
as a protection mechanism and reduces domestic violence significantly. In 
fact, the presence of family members seems to outweigh the effect of forced 
displacement. However, the coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent 
level. The OLS coefficient estimate for less severe forms of domestic violence 
is not statistically significant. Once we instrument, the coefficient for severe 
domestic violence is no longer significant.  
As discussed in previous sections, two causes might be producing the 
sudden emergence of domestic violence in forcefully displaced families. On 
the one hand, the violence endured just prior to migrating may cause post-
traumatic stress syndrome, which may escalate aggressive behavior against 
other household members. On the other, male frustration caused by 
unemployment, the improved labor conditions of women, and the challenges 
these pose to traditional gender roles may spur domestic violence, as men seek 
to vent stress and increase their control. The IV estimation exploits the   34 
exogenous variation, eliminating any unobservable variables that are related to 
the purposive targeting from armed groups and labor outcomes. A higher 
frequency of domestic violence among forcefully displaced households may 
result from post-traumatic stress caused by the violent events leading to 
migration, and not to changes in labor conditions. The trauma from violence, 
and not the need to vent stress, seems to be what is escalating domestic 
violence following forced displacement. A word of caution is in order. As we 
lack information on the out-migration state of the forcefully displaced, our 
instrument is not strong, and this may reduce the precision of our coefficient 
estimate.  
[Table 12 goes about here] 
The higher incidence of domestic violence among forcefully displaced 
households could be present before displacement and could simply have 
persisted following migration. However, we do not have information about the 
incidence of domestic violence among displaced families prior to forced 
migration. To explore this possibility, we estimate whether the probability that 
the husband was violently punished by his parents is systematically higher for 
forcefully displaced households. This question was only included for 2005. If 
the effect is positive and significant, it might be that our results are driven by 
the persistence of domestic violence and did not necessarily emerge as a result 
of forced displacement. Results in Table 13 show that this is not the case. The 
coefficient for forced displacement is negative and not significant.   35 
[Table 13 goes about here] 
The escalation of domestic violence against women could induce 
mothers to violently punish their children. Table 14 reports the results for 
whether children were violently punished by their parents. We estimate 
separate regressions for punishment inflicted by the mother and the father. 
While forcefully displaced fathers are not more likely to violently punish their 
children, mothers are 5.4 percent more likely to do so. However, when we 
instrument, the coefficient for violent punishment by the father and the mother 
becomes negative and statistically significant. This reinforces our 
interpretation that a higher use of violent punishment on children may be the 
result of forced displacement and the traumatic events faced by families as a 
consequence.  
[Table 14 goes about here] 
The higher incidence of domestic violence within displaced households 
may capture their willingness to report this phenomenon more. In urban areas, 
gender roles are less traditional, and public campaigns against domestic 
violence may motivate women to report the incidence of domestic violence 
more. To explore this issue, we estimate the probability that a woman victim 
of domestic violence seek formal or informal support after the event.
7 Table 16 
shows that the estimated OLS coefficients of the displacement dummy are not 
                                                            
7 Informal help includes family members, relatives, and neighbors. Formal help includes 
police, family commissariats, ICBF (state institution in charge of family issues), district 
attorneys, and health institutions.   36 
statistically significant for formal institutions and negative and statistically 
significant for informal institutions. In fact, after instrumenting, the coefficient 
estimate for formal institutions becomes negative and statistically significant, 
which confirms that women from forcefully displaced households are indeed 
more likely to face domestic violence. In fact, the negative coefficient for 
formal institutions may signal that forcefully displaced women are less willing 
to report incidents of domestic violence. Thus, our coefficient estimates might 
be underestimating the impact of forced displacement on the incidence of 
domestic violence. 
[Table 16 goes about here] 
We conduct two additional robustness checks. First, we estimate the 
same regressions for economic migrants from rural areas. The results in Table 
17 reveal a different picture. Women’s bargaining strength over each 
dimension is not higher relative to the control group, yet having a final say on 
large and food purchases and all issues shows a negative and significant effect 
for economic migrants. The coefficient estimate for domestic violence is not 
statistically significant. The IV estimation shows that the negative impact is no 
longer statistically significant for food purchases, while violent punishment 
against from the father is positive and significant. 
[Table 17 goes about here]   37 
Second, we estimate all of the regressions for the sample of rural 
households from municipalities featuring the out-migration of forcefully 
displaced persons (Table 18). The results are similar to those for the complete 
sample. Although we drop many observations for the DHS2000/10 sample, the 
main results hold.  
[Table 18 goes about here] 
Using labor and bargaining-power data, we get a comprehensive picture of 
the impact of forced displacement on labor-market participation, changes in 
bargaining power within households, and domestic violence. The optimistic 
picture of conflict empowering women is less straightforward than has been 
presented until now. For women forcefully displaced, employment and labor 
income are higher than for their rural counterparts, while men face tight labor 
markets. However, the contribution of forcefully displaced women to 
household earnings is higher and is driven mostly by an increment in working 
hours. As predicted by some economic models, wages—and not earnings—
improve the threat point, and thus women’s ability, to appropriate a larger 
share of a household’s surplus. As a result, women’s bargaining power in 
displaced households is similar to that of their rural counterpart, domestic 
violence against women escalates, and children are more likely to be punished 
violently by their mothers. The traumatic events prior to displacement may be 
the cause of this escalating violence. Since we do not observe displaced 
women who separated from their partners due to domestic violence, we might   38 
be underestimating the impact of displacement on women’s bargaining 
strength and overestimating the coefficient for domestic violence.  
4.  Conclusion 
Internal conflict forces large numbers of persons to flee as they seek refuge 
from the aggressions of armed groups. Forced migration is often accompanied 
by asset losses, sharp drops in income, and a deterioration in labor conditions 
(Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ibáñez and Moya 2010). Changes in labor conditions 
are heterogeneous for forcefully displaced men and women. The labor 
experience of men is mainly in agricultural activities, something rarely in 
demand in urban labor markets, whereas women’s skills are more akin to 
urban occupations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of 
forced displacement on female labor participation, distributions of power 
within households, and domestic violence.  
We find that forcefully displaced women’s contributions to household 
incomes are larger than those of their rural counterparts. In contrast to the 
control group—rural female workers—women from forcefully displaced 
households are employed with a higher probability, work more hours, and earn 
higher wages. On the other hand, males from forcefully displaced households 
participate less, but work more hours and have higher wages. Despite their 
greater contribution to household earnings, women’s bargaining power is not 
statistically significant from the control group, and domestic violence is 
higher, presumably due to victimization men experienced just prior to   39 
displacement. However, when we estimate the IV coefficients, the effect is not 
statistically significant. The domestic violence of mother against children is 
larger, but only for the OLS estimation.  
These results may reflect that post-traumatic stress, and not 
underperformance of men in urban labor markets, may cause the higher 
incidence of domestic violence. Forced displacement is preceded by traumatic 
events—massacres, selective homicides, sexual assaults, and direct threats, 
among other things. Being the victim of such things may cause anger, 
frustration, and post-traumatic stress syndrome, which may create the 
conditions under which domestic violence will likely escalate.  
Two complementary causes may explain these results. First, the larger 
contributions of displaced women to household earnings seems to be driven 
mostly by longer working hours following displacement, something that 
implies a drop in leisure time. Second, the low-income levels of forcefully 
displaced households and the difficulty of relying on social networks in a new 
and unknown city may restrict the possibility of marriage dissolution. Thus, 
improvements in labor conditions induce longer working hours, while 
women’s bargaining power remains constant, and domestic violence increases.  
The rising labor participation of women, accompanied by an escalation 
in domestic violence, may amplify the costs of conflict. The participation of 
women in the labor force appears not to be strengthening their bargaining 
power. In addition, the prevalence of domestic violence may imply that   40 
children from these families are more likely to be victims or perpetrators of 
domestic violence in their adult lives, increasing the generational transmission 
of violence. Policies directed at increasing women’s bargaining power, such as 
providing subsidies directly to women and designing special education 
programs, as well as offering psychological support to displaced families, may 





























































































































Table 1. Robustness Checks: Municipal Tax Collection and Value of Rural Credits Provided 
Variables  Municipal tax collection  
Value credit Banco 
Agrario Value  credit  Finagro 
                    
Rainfall total lag (state)  -1.214  -1.446 -0.004  0.002  -0.232  -0.309 
 [1.514]  [1.517]  [0.164] [0.166]  [0.247] [0.245] 
Total investment pc  -0.001  -0.001+  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.001  -0.001 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.001] 
Total investment pc lag  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]
Total displacement     0.803    -0.045    -0.342** 
 [0.892] [0.044]   [0.104]
Total displacement lagged (t-1)    1.157    0.084*    0.135* 
   [0.789]    [0.041]   [0.068] 
Number of homicides     -140.800+    -1.249    -14.891** 
   [82.131]    [1.698]    [2.945] 
Number of homicides lagged (t-1)    -8.328    -3.049    22.696** 
   [29.341]    [2.075]    [4.792] 
Constant 7,038.663  9,504.457+  578.192+ 459.480 1,908.511**  1,420.754** 
  [4,313.683] [5,410.181] [304.723] [330.416]  [483.327]  [443.723] 
Municipality fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 9,324  9,324  9,334  9,334  9,334  9,334 
R-squared 0.004  0.141  0.100 0.113  0.063  0.090 
Robust standard errors in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 Source: authors’ calculations based on CEDE municipal panel and IDEAM 
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All  Married Women  Married Men 
   Men Women    Non-displaced  Displaced    Non-displaced  Displaced    
Years of age  40,433  32.75   33.13   40.04   36.16   ***  42.84   40.44   *** 
(15.04) (15.24) (12.22) (11.04) (11.49) (10.80)
Years of education completed   39,192  4.67   4.99   ***  4.12   6.48   ***  3.82   6.32   *** 
(3.34) (3.47)  (3.18)  (4.20) (3.17)  (4.20) 
Number household members  40,433  5.42   5.49   4.95   5.18   *  4.94   4.97  
(2.58) (2.52)  (2.10)  (2.05) (2.07)  (2.02) 
Number children under 5 years  40,433  0.62   0.69   ***  0.69   0.79   *  0.73   0.78  
(0.92) (0.95)  (0.91)  (0.86) (0.91)  (0.88) 
 =1 if displaced person  40,433  1%  2%  0%  100%  0%  100% 
 = 1 if employed   40,433  75%  31%  ***  30% 31%  93% 75%  *** 
Real hourly wage USD  21,479  0.39   0.41   0.42   0.88   ***  0.43   0.78   *** 
(0.50) (0.66)  (0.60)  (1.21) (0.53)  (1.06) 
Hours worked per week  21,494  47.63   36.30   ***  33.72   39.35   **  50.59   56.19   *** 
(16.58)  (20.62)  (20.74) (21.80)  (16.02) (19.48) 
Bargaining strength   12,724  0.88   0.66   ***  0.52   0.69   ***  0.87   0.90   ** 
      (0.24)  (0.34)     (0.30) (0.29)     (0.25) (0.22)    
Test for mean differences *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001–2005   
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Bargaining Strength 
  
Obs.  Non- 
displaced  Displaced    
Women: final say on health issues  13,016  62.36%  63.09%   
Women: final say on large purchases  12,979  18.38%  19.15%   
Women: final say on daily needs  13,009  34.71%  36.92%   
Women: final say on food to eat  13,014  78.70%  72.97%  ** 
Women: final say on all issues  13,021  7.83%  8.24%   
Index say in all issues—principal components   13,021  -0.783  -0.792   
   (1.01)  (1.03)   
Experienced mild violence  12,796  30.75%  35.97%  * 
Experienced severe violence  12,796  9.10%  14.73%  ** 
Children experienced domestic violence—father  12,153  45.43%  49.11%   
Children experienced domestic violence –mother  12,153  70.62%  80.87%  *** 
Father ever beat mother  13,021  31.89%  30.10%   
Partner mistreated by parents
 4,450  25.99%  34.86%  * 
Seek formal help after mistreatment   4,091  8.58%  5.94%   
Seek informal help after mistreatment  4,089  33.05%  26.12%    
Test for mean differences ** *p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1 
￿￿Only DHS2005      








Displaced households    
  
Non- 
displaced Displaced     
Years of age  13,021  34.07  32.76   *** 
(8.80) (7.93) 
Years of age - partner  13,013  39.05  37.96   * 
(10.45) (9.53) 
Years of education   13,021  5.36  5.39  
(3.63) (3.69) 
Years of education - partner  12,804  5.49  5.76  
(4.58) (4.91) 
Household size  13,021  5.23  5.58   *** 
(2.15) (2.41) 
Number of children between 0 and 1 years   13,021  0.27  0.29  
(0.49) (0.53) 
Number of children between 2 and 5 years  13,021  0.55  0.65   ** 
(0.72) (0.70) 
 = 1 if unskilled worker 12,749  0.48  0.56  *** 
 = 1 if partner unskilled worker  13,005  0.73  0.68  * 
Wealth index  13,020  -1.52  -0.32  *** 
(1.67) (1.59) 
 = 1 if respondent migrated with 
brothers/sisters 13,021      0.08  *** 
Test for mean differences *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  













Table 5. First-Stage Labor Outcomes 
    = if displaced person 
Variables  Men  
Married 
men   Women  
Married 
women 
              
Total yearly rainfall lagged: out-
migration state 
0.206*** 0.206*** 0.215***  0.203*** 
[0.010] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] 
Years of age  0.001*** -0.000 0.000**  -0.001*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education   0.009*** 0.013*** 0.006***  0.010*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of household members  0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005***  0.008*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tax collection   1.701*** 1.627*** 1.888***  1.441*** 
[0.167] [0.260] [0.177] [0.230] 
Observations  19882 8444 19026  8786 
R-squared  0.273 0.274 0.293 0.260 
F- Weak identification test   210.3 385.9 526.9 207.7 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Bootstrap standard in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Total rainfall in 10^-3 mms. 










Table 6. Probability of Employment (Heckman Selection Equation) 
  Men   Married men   Women   Married women 
 Variables  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
 = 1 if displaced person   -0.427*** -0.672*** -0.749*** -1.126***  0.240***  0.051  0.180***  -0.174 
[0.040] [0.154] [0.071] [0.274]  [0.038] [0.139] [0.065]  [0.249] 
Observations  19894 19882  8452  8444  19035 19026  8788 8786 
State fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Included controls: Years of age, years of education, number of household members, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, tax collection.  
Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  










Table 7. Labor Outcomes—Heckman Selection Correction  
   Men   Married men   Women   Married women 
   OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
I. Hours worked per week  
 = 1 if displaced person   11.434*** 18.350***  4.345**  10.977***  9.326***  13.118***  4.796**  15.615** 
[0.700]  [2.936]  [1.819] [3.814]  [1.614] [3.283] [1.867] [6.568] 
Observations  19894  19882  8452 8444 19035  19026 8788 8786 
R-squared  0.126  0.018  0.097 0.008 0.061 0.009 0.078 -0.002 
II. Log hourly wages  
 = 1 if displaced person   0.203*** 0.392*** 0.117**  0.223*  0.336***  0.157  0.217***  0.466* 
[0.033]  [0.106]  [0.057] [0.117]  [0.076] [0.120] [0.082] [0.252] 
Observations  19894  19882  8452 8444 19035  19026 8788 8786 
R-squared  0.123  0.089  0.168 0.137 0.219 0.188 0.249 0.200 
III. Bargaining strength  
 = 1 if displaced person   0.119*** 0.392*** 
[0.025] [0.106] 
Observations  8788 8786
R-squared  0.084 0.089 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included controls: Years of age, years of education, number of household members, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001–2005, IDEAM, and CEDE. 
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Table 8. Labor Outcomes for Sample Restricted to Out-Migration 
Municipalities 
   Men   Married men   Women   Married women 
I. Probability of employment (selection equation—Probit estimation) 
 = 1 if displaced person   -0.681***  -1.125***  0.038  -0.19 
[0.153] [0.276] [0.145] [0.255] 
Observations 19680  8359  18828  8695 
II. Hours worked per week (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if displaced person   18.388***  11.134***  13.019***  15.948** 
[2.861] [3.763] [3.152]  [6.290] 
Observations 19680  8359  18828  8695 
R-squared 0.018  0.008  0.009  -0.003 
III. Log hourly wages (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if displaced person   0.389***  0.226*  0.154  0.465* 
[0.101] [0.115] [0.116]  [0.242] 
Observations 14816  7740  5598  2588 
R-squared 0.089  0.137  0.188  0.201 
19680 8359 18828  8695 
IV. Bargaining strength (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if displaced person   0.169* 
[0.090] 
Observations 8695 
R-squared  0.029 
State fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Included controls: Years of age, years of education, number of household members, homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants, tax collection. 
Instrumental variable: share of migrants in receiving municipality.  
Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001–2005, IDEAM, and CEDE.  
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Table 9. Economic Migrants: Labor Outcomes 
   Men   Married men   Women   Married women 
    OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
I. Probability of employment (selection equation—Probit estimation) 
 = 1 if economic migrant   -0.284*** -0.517 -0.789*** 0.155 0.574*** 0.614** 0.237** 0.302
[0.081] [0.415] [0.152] [0.829]  [0.064] [0.268]  [0.109] [0.514] 
Observations  5340 5340 2177 2177  5254 5254  2436 2436 
II. Hours worked per week (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if economic migrant   10.573***  12.746  7.484***  0.889  13.974  -22.641  7.651**  15.663 
[1.144]  [40.060]  [2.778]  [21.277] [9.586] [1,262.049]  [3.737]  [244.876] 
Observations  5340 5340 2177 2177  5254 5254  2436 2436 
R-squared  0.147 0.037 0.151 0.026  0.129 -0.217 0.139 0.026 
III. Log hourly wages (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if economic migrant   0.267***  0.305  0.043  0.252  0.370  -2.397  0.135  -0.260 
[0.054] [1.957] [0.152] [1.907]  [0.458]  [12.784] [0.101]  [44.462] 
Observations  5340 5340 2177 2177  5254 5254  2436 2436 
R-squared  0.201 0.153 0.208 0.164  0.212 -0.837 0.403 0.335 
IV. Bargaining strength (IV estimation—Heckman selection correction) 
 = 1 if economic migrant   0.283*** -0.298 
[0.045] [6.831]
Observations  2436 2436 
R-squared                    0.178  -0.199 
State fixed effects   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Year dummies     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Included controls: Years of age, years of education, number of household members, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Instrumental variable: share of migrants in receiving municipality.  
Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  












Table 10.  First-Stage Estimation for Bargaining Strength and Domestic 
Violence 
    = 1 if displaced person  
     




F- Weak identification test  18.20 
State fixed effects   Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
Total rainfall in 10^-3 mms.  
Included controls: Education level, partner's education, years of age, partner's age, 
wealth index, number of household members, number of children between 0 and 1 
years of age, number of children between 2 and 5 years of age, =1 if partner is 
unskilled worker, =1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters, =1 if father ever 
hurt mother, = 1 if formal marriage, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax 
collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 





Table 11. Bargaining Strength (=1 if Women Have Final Say in)—Linear 
Probability Model   
   Women has final say in  
Dependent variable  Health issues  Large purchases   Daily needs 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
=1 if displaced person  -0.047+  -0.202  0.023  0.226  0.013  0.020 
  [0.026]  [0.376] [0.029] [0.265] [0.033] [0.470] 
Observations  12324  12324 12289 12289 12318 12318 
R-squared  0.058  0.032 0.046 0.015 0.061 0.037 
   Women has final say in  
Dependent variable  Food purchases  All issues  PC—all issues 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
=1 if displaced person  -0.021  -0.058  0.010  0.082  0.031  -0.085 
  [0.031]  [0.281] [0.019] [0.154] [0.068] [0.662] 
Observations  12322  12322 12329 12329 12329 12329 
R-squared  0.085  0.070 0.029 0.017 0.133 0.103 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included controls: Education level, partner's education, years of age, partner's age, wealth index, 
number of household members, number of children between 0 and 1 years of age, number of children 
between 2 and 5 years of age, =1 if partner unskilled worker, =1 if respondent migrated with 
brothers/sisters, =1 if father ever hurt mother, = 1 if formal marriage, homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  





Table 12. Domestic Violence (=1 if Women Experienced Severe or Less 
Severe Violence at Hands of Partner) 
Dependent variable 
All married women  
Severe forms  Less severe forms 
OLS IV OLS IV 
=1 if displaced person  0.039*  0.114  0.049  0.341 
   [0.015]  [0.153]  [0.031]  [0.304] 
Observations 12114  12114  12114  12114 
R-squared 0.044  0.028  0.075  0.038 
State fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Included controls: year of completed education of woman and partner, years of age of woman and 
partner, household wealth index, number of household members, marriage-length controls and dummy 
variable for children under 5 years present, partner unskilled worker, if respondent migrated with 
brothers or sisters, if her father ever hurt her mother, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax 
collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/2005/2010, IDEAM, and CEDE 
 
 
Table 13. Domestic Violence before Displacement (=1 if Partner 
Mistreated by Parents)—Linear Probability Model 
    = 1 if partner mistreated by parents 
   OLS  IV 
=1 if displaced person  0.071 -0.224 
 [0.051] [0.182] 
Observations 4362  4362 
R-squared 0.087  0.045 
State fixed effects   Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Included controls: year of completed education of woman and partner, years of age of woman and 
partner, household wealth index, number of household members, marriage-length controls and dummy 
variable for children under 5 years present, partner unskilled worker, if respondent migrated with 
brothers or sister, if her father ever hurt her mother, and homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax 
collection. 
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  






Table 14. Violent Punishment (=1 if Children Experienced Violent 
Punishment by the Father and/or Mother)—Linear Probability Model
  
   Father  Mother 
   OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
=1 if displaced person  -0.002  -0.884*  0.054+  -0.826* 
 [0.027]  [0.389]  [0.027]  [0.382] 
Observations 11516  11516  11516  11516 
R-squared 0.071  -0.053  0.113  -0.051 
State fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Included controls: year of completed education of woman and partner, years of age of 
woman and partner, household wealth index, number of household members, marriage-
length controls and dummy variable for children under 5 years present, partner unskilled 
worker, if respondent migrated with brothers or sisters, if her father ever hurt her mother, 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2005, IDEAM, and CEDE
 
 
Table 16. Formal or Informal Support (=1 if Women Seek Help after 
Mistreatment)—Linear Probability Model   
   Formal institutions   Informal institutions  
   OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
=1 if displaced person  -0.005  -0.461+  -0.097*  -0.903 
 [0.014] [0.263] [0.045] [0.579] 
Observations 3874 3874 3872 3872 
R-squared 0.109  -0.084  0.044  -0.078 
State fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Informal help: family members, relatives, and neighbors.  
Formal help: police, family commissariat, ICBF, district attorney, health institute.  
Included controls: year of completed education of woman and partner, years of age of woman 
and partner, household wealth index, number of household members, marriage-length controls 
and dummy variable for children under 5 years present, partner unskilled worker, if respondent 
migrated with brothers or sisters and if her father ever hurt her mother homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/2005/2010, IDEAM, and CEDE  
  57
Table 17. Economic Migrants: Bargaining Strength and Domestic Violence   
   Women has final say in  
Health issues  Large purchases   Daily needs  Food purchases  All issues 
   OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
                                
 = 1 economic 
migrant   -0.037  0.001  -0.040*  -0.036  -0.009  0.282  -0.032*  -1.098+  -0.018+  0.084 
[0.040] [0.523] [0.017] [0.387] [0.025] [0.575]  [0.014]  [0.622]  [0.009]  [0.303] 
Observations  5371 5371 5333 5333 5365 5365  5364  5364  5375  5375 
R-squared  0.051 0.040 0.060 0.028 0.075 0.016  0.109  -0.434  0.038  0.015 





   OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
 = 1 economic 
migrant   0.174**  0.573  0.022  0.761  -0.030  -0.253  0.047  1.558+  0.025  1.110 
[0.052] [0.763] [0.021] [0.467] [0.031] [0.418]  [0.029]  [0.802]  [0.016]  [0.730] 
Observations  5375 5375 5232 5232 5232 5232  4953  4953  4953  4953 
R-squared  0.163 0.114 0.035 -0.512 0.082 0.035  0.078  -0.658  0.141  -0.368 
State fixed 
effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Included controls: Education level, partner's education, years of age, partner's age, wealth index, number of household members, number of children between 0 
and 1 years of age, number of children between 2 and 5 years of age, =1 if partner unskilled worker, =1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters, =1 if father 
ever hurt mother, = 1 if formal marriage, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Instrumental variable: share of migrants in receiving municipality. 
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/2005/2010, IDEAM, and CEDE 
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Table 18. Only Out-Migration Municipalities: Bargaining Strength and Domestic Violence  
   Women has final say in  
  Health issues  Large purchases   Daily needs  Food purchases  All issues 
   OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV  OLS  IV  OLS IV 
=1 if displaced  -0.047+  -0.194 0.023 0.231 0.013 0.032 -0.020  -0.055  0.010 0.087 
  [0.026] [0.372] [0.029] [0.263] [0.033] [0.466] [0.031] [0.280] [0.019] [0.154]
Observations  12309 12309 12274 12274 12303 12303  12307  12307  12314 12314 
R-squared  0.058 0.033 0.046 0.015 0.061 0.037 0.085  0.070  0.029 0.017 









   OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV  OLS  IV  OLS IV 
=1 if displaced  0.029 -0.107  0.040*  0.109 0.050 0.328 -0.001  -0.883*  0.054+  -0.827* 
  [0.068] [0.654] [0.015] [0.152] [0.031] [0.302]  [0.026]  [0.386]  [0.027] [0.379] 
Observations  12314 12314 12099 12099 12099 12099  11502  11502  11502 11502 
R-squared  0.134 0.103 0.044 0.029 0.075 0.039  0.071  -0.053  0.113 -0.051 
State fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Included controls: Education level, partner's education, years of age, partner's age, wealth index, number of household members, number of 
children between 0 and 1 years of age, number of children between 2 and 5 years of age, =1 if partner unskilled worker, =1 if respondent 
migrated with brothers/sisters, =1 if father ever hurt mother, = 1 if formal marriage, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and tax collection.  
Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.  
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/2005/2010, IDEAM, and CEDE 
 
 
 